

Astrid B. Boening - astridboening1@aol.com
University of Miami/Coral Gables, FL – USA
PhD Candidate – International Studies

Private: 20335 W. Country Club Dr. #106
Aventura, FL 33180 - USA

Skype: astridboening1

Presentation at the Fourth TransAtlantic Dialogue on: The Status of
Inter-Governmental Relations and Multi-Level Governance in Europe and the US
“Workshop #2”

at:
Bocconi University, Milan/Italy: June 12 – 14, 2008

**Pronouncements of its impending Demise were Exaggerated:
the EuroMed Partnership morphing into a Regional Security Super-Complex?**

ABSTRACT

Buzan and Waever (2003) have proposed in “Regions and Powers” that there exists i.a. a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex due to the complexity of their internal securitization processes and degree of security interdependence. However, I suggest alternately that the economic, political and social interdependence which continues to deepen within the EuroMed Partnership (EMP)¹ shows more likely a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC) instead. In fact, one might consider this region in terms of a Regional Security Super Complex via a transatlantic umbilicus in light of the long-standing support the US has shown the Euro-Mediterranean region, i.a. through its engagement with NATO’s Mediterranean Partnership.

Some authors, such as Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, 5) hold that this enhanced Euro-Mediterranean-Atlantic multilateralism could be anticipated with recent changes in US policies towards the Middle East and North Africa, based on a narrowed transatlantic gap following a successful exit strategy from Iraq in the triangular nature (in Aliboni and Qatarneh’s words) of Mediterranean relations between the U.S., the EU and the Arab states.

Acknowledging the security interdependence of the Euro-Mediterranean region, i.a. through the work by the EMP to address the security sectors which Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have identified, such as, beyond the military, also economic, environmental, societal, individual etc. factors, would lead to the justification of this assertion.

¹ To be succeeded by the “Union for the Mediterranean” (UMed) officially in July 2008. In this paper, the EMP will be discussed within its past and current paradigm, and the UMed in terms of future Euro-Mediterranean perspectives as applicable.

Pronouncements of its impending Demise were Exaggerated:

The EuroMed Partnership Morphing into a Regional Security Super-Complex?

Astrid B. Boening

Introduction

The security issues facing the countries bordering the Mediterranean today are addressed bilaterally (especially pertaining to those countries bordering the Mediterranean on both shores), inter-regionally (e.g. between the Euro-Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), multilaterally (e.g. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue), and also, as I am proposing here: (super-) regionally in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex – and, extrapolated, a transatlantic Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC), utilizing Buzan and Waever's (2003) terminology. One might view this apparent alignment in terms of Henry Kissinger's (2008) observations:

No previous generation has had to deal with different revolutions occurring simultaneously in separate parts of the world[:] ... (a) the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; (b) the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Objectives: De-securitizing a regional security complex?!

Ulla Holm (2004, 1) viewed the dialectic faced by the European Union (EU) in the Mediterranean in terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone. This is interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy (rather than as empire-builder) through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting political shared European values. Spencer (2001, 18) notes that the development of relations of trust has as the end goal of security "the absence of war": we need to distance ourselves from the colonial victim-victimizer mindset but emancipate ourselves, regardless of which role some may have had a hundred years ago. In this context, the route proposed by Amartya Sen (1999) in promoting development as a significant route to freedom is relevant. This freedom from war, want etc. does not occur in isolation by one country at the expense of another. Peace-building in the early years of the EuroMed Partnership's (EMP) existence can be characterized as an "automatic result of Euro-Med economic cooperation, rather than as a comprehensive early warning/conflict prevention concept or policy" (Aliboni, Guazzone, and Pioppi 2001, introduction), although a start has been made by studies and resultant models by the Italian foreign ministry as well as by EuroMeSCo² in particular in developing a broader concept for peacebuilding in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

While there have been a number of political cooperation initiatives involving this region, the latest being French president Sarkozy's proposal of a "Mediterranean Union" (MU), in this paper I start with an analysis of some the security-related dynamics within the framework of the EMP

² EuroMeSCo as a network of independent institutes from the thirty-seven member countries of the EMP, functioning "both as an official confidence-building measure within the EMP and as a source of analytical expertise in the policy and security fields with which it is concerned (EuroMeSCo website).

(Thornhill 2007a and 2007b)³, often referred to as the Barcelona Process. Studying the Mediterranean as a geo-political region, Pace (2003, 161) states that “the study of regions must in some way include the study of meaning and identity”. Other authors, such as Shamsaddin Megalommatis (2007) are of the opinion that, pertaining to the Arabic and Islamic neighbors of the EU, only Turkey and Iran matter at all. To re-think the Mediterranean region in a relational, political context, Pace (Ibid.) suggests focusing on agency and structure in the analysis of the “processual” aspects of region making.

Regional Integration

Intellectually, any regional integration is to be welcomed, such as e.g. the Arab League to counter Arab division (Chourou 2001, 68) on the Southern Mediterranean. However, I would guard against the founding of infinite organizations as their own process which will substitute action with only more talk. The EMP has the potential to be expanded *greatly*, especially under its new framework as UMed, within the concept of “security as indivisible” (Deutsch). Path-dependency in the MEP with respect to accelerating integration is in relation to those socio-historical developments which favor its evolution, such as globalization pressures, international regimes and global governance.

Hence the EMP and its future potential, like the EU, can be analyzed i.a. according to a variety of integration theories, depending on the question asked about it. While both the EMP and the EU continue to evolve, at this point *intra*-regional economic, political and social integration in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is weak (e.g. Schumacher 2004, 92). While north-south *inter*-regional integration between MENA and the EU is being nourished, inter-regional integration between MENA and regions to the east and west is also weak, but significant in light of the tectonic shifts some writers attribute to the current developments in Iran as well as in Iraq (e.g. Schumacher 2004, 95), as well as the unique dynamics of Jihadist terrorism⁴ alluded to by Henry Kissinger

This paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union (EU) and its southern Mediterranean neighbors in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it meaning, as well as potentially leading to a reciprocal “re-construction” of their self-identity in the context of a regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 1998 and 2003). This analysis gained renewed prominence following the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of 1999 and “the need to examine the security and defence dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” (Heisbourg 2001, 5).

The EuroMed Partnership and some Security Implications

Spencer (2001, 14), among other authors, also recognizes geographical proximity as contributing to a “blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key concern to the EU, namely the very human issue of migration in all its dimensions”. This necessitates i.a. addressing the economic insufficiencies of the “sending” states which lead to emigration out of this despair (i.e. mostly from northern Africa to the southern EU), and cooperating in the repatriation of these EU-immigrants. Of course, some authors (such as Chourou 2001, 58) doubt that “security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all” unless there are very long-term considerations, and that “participation must be open to all

³ Since the newly agreed upon “Union for the Mediterranean” will not be inaugurated until July 2008, its modifications to the EMP will be addressed in this paper, but its dynamics are speculative for now.

⁴ as it rejects “national sovereignty based on secular state models” (Kissinger 2008, 1) as it is based on religion, not states, and does not recognize the legitimacy of the international system nor the internal structure of existing states (Ibid., 2)..

countries that have clear stakes in the issues to be discussed even if such countries are not Mediterranean in strict geographical terms” (Chourou 2001, 59/60).

In a world which is in greater political and socio-economic transformation than ever before, I propose an adjustment to the Regional Security Complex Theory delineated by Buzan and Waever (2003) with respect to the Middle East Regional Security Complex in favor of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex to more accurately represent the complex socio-economic and political inter-linkages and dynamics in fact observed. While this proposal requires a lengthy discussion of the complex issues and supporting data involved in this theoretical construct of a EMRSC, space limitations permit only a brief overview over a small sample of its issues and their dynamics, in addition to brief references to other authors’ observations, which would also point towards my hypothesis.

This paper draws on the sectors and levels proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in their new framework for security analysis. Beyond the military sector it would also include e.g. environmental, terrorist threats (as transnational, mostly non-state actor, and often civil law enforcement threats), as well as energy, food and water, drug and arms trafficking, economic/financial, and individual (e.g. human trafficking) security “sectors”. The “levels” pertaining to a theoretical EMRSC are i.a. the sub/intra-regional (e.g. from some viewpoints the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the inter-regional (e.g. the Euro-Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), the bilateral level (e.g. France and Morocco), the international (i.e. the foreign relations between the states within and outside the regions in question), and, lastly, as Van Langenhove (2008) proposed, a neo-Westphalian level. This last level is from a viewpoint of global governance where the world of states gradually becomes “a world of states *and* of regions” (Van Langenhove 2008a, 115) (italics mine). This concept of neo-Westphalian “Second Generation Regionalism” (Van Langenhove 2008b) identified integration in non-economic matters such as justice, security, culture (Ibid.).

There are a multitude of considerations for Europe’s engagement in MENA. The EMP constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa⁵. Additionally, Euro-Mediterranean security in many forms of course has been front page news in this region especially since World War II at least, only to catapult to a higher priority for a number of reasons. Beyond the security implications of the *economic* disparities within MENA and between it and the EU, indirect issues arise through *societal* security, e.g. when thousands of mostly economic refugees leave North Africa annually on a dangerous Mediterranean crossing to EU territory, such as the Canary Islands, Gibraltar or Italy. While this journey results in numerous fatalities among the refugees due to the treacherous transportation devices used, the arrival of the refugees in the EU represents a problem in terms of illegal and undocumented immigration at a time of increased border security world wide. It also forces the EU to undertake expensive repatriation to the sometimes uncooperative countries of origin. An indirect consequence of unequal economic development is also its linkage to *political* unrest which in turns becomes fertile ground for terrorism in MENA and which has been spreading progressively to “the West”, including Europe. Zinn (2006) argues that war is not a successful approach to defeat terrorism by religious extremists, which continues to spread within and around MENA because it fails to address the causes of terrorism, be they insufficient civil society (e.g. local police enforcement, or inadequate social services to address the needs of the disadvantaged).

The traditional weak link in Western economic security is energy. The most recent challenge to the European Union’s energy security is its reliance on an increasingly mafia-like Russia and its client states, which are politically potentially more unstable than the Middle East.

⁵ Although the relations between the EU and individual MENA countries are predominantly based on bilateral agreements (“action plans”) today. Additionally, although the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is presented externally as unified, EU member countries, especially those on the EU’s southern shore, continue to maintain privileged bilateral diplomatic and economic relationships with some MENA countries.

From an EU standpoint, the political and economic unreliability of Russia as a petroleum source became exacerbated i.a. when Russia expanded its questionable reputation further extra-territorially by signing an agreement with Algeria to restrain foreign investments (particularly in the petroleum sector) in the latter country (Dombey 2006), and hence e.g. impeding multilaterality and open markets in Algeria (an EMP member state).

In the context of energy security in the Euro-Med region, Libya, though currently still holding observer status in the EMP at the moment due to the international embargo, is being re-socialized into the organization. This issue rose to the top of negotiations recently when French president Sarkozy proposed the MU. At the time of this writing, the vague goals of the MU have been transformed into the proposed Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), whose inauguration is expected for July 2008 at the French EU summit. The UMed is anticipated to enhance the saliency of the EMP to achieve a more effective and deeper integration among its member states - the significance underscored by the State-owned Russian gas group, Gazprom, likely to secure energy assets in Libya (together with Eni) in order to gain "long-sought entry to north African oil and gas fields and tightening its grip on European markets" (Gorst 2008).

The EuroMed Partnership: Growing up to be a (super-) regional Actor?

This paper seeks to examine the interconnectedness of the diverse security aspects and the reciprocal geo-political as well as socio-economic significance in the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) from a regional perspective, as they continue to remain near the top of the security agendas of its member states in part as a result of the conflicts bordering it (i.e. Iran and Iraq) (Fernández 2007). Noting that Buzan, Waever and de Wilde are diverging from the traditional military definition of security by adding "soft" areas, such as economic, environmental, societal and individual security, we turn to Joffé (2001, 55) who refers to the EMP as

a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have interesting social and cultural consequences and should be the real paradigm for the future ... [where] soft power projection becomes interdependence as the 'forgotten frontier' becomes the common arena

– the stated objective of the Barcelona Process, if not its underlying purpose indeed: The EMP's initial specific mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to EU and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on "comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history" (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). This reflects dynamics of a security community. According to the literature today on development and the synchronicity between political, economic and societal security, the framework of the EMP was conceptualized from the beginning to provide the groundwork for accommodating this interconnectedness in the relationship between the neighbors along the Northern and Southern Mediterranean⁶.

However, upon the tenth anniversary of the EMP in 2005, critical voices reflected impatience with this process⁷. Nevertheless, despite the very short time period of the EMP's

⁶ This is frequently referred to as the "three basket-structure" of the EMP and which I will refer to occasionally as "the paradigm" of the EMP.

⁷ As an example see Spencer (2001, 19), writing that "without rethinking this kind of exclusion [of relegating Palestinian aspirations to democracy and a territorial state to a secondary order of priority by the EU] even short term security planning has started to become illusory". I suggest that the EMP should be considered neither short-term nor does every security issue between EMP members be a priority – sometimes for political reasons, the process needs to be "re-prioritized" to allow for the right moment to address it properly, even if this means e.g. adjusting the sense of Anglo-Saxon "time" with the "sense of time" in MENA: why cry failure when some members have not had sufficient time to process all variables (considering the EMP relationship is one of many political and socio-economic relationships politicians on both sides of the Mediterranean are balancing against each other?).

existence, indications point to the EMP (and its anticipated reemergence as the UMed) as evolving to be a more coherent and effective regional integration project. It is recognized that “economic change also produces social change” (Joffé 2001, 46). The proposals for future projects⁸, and projects already accomplished by the EMP during the past thirteen years are expected to lead to economic development and export-oriented growth in MENA, along with market-accessibility in the EU and hereby contribute to the reduction of political pressures having security consequences. Additionally, political and social transparency, and accountability are also required as factors to attract foreign direct investments to ensure successful private sector development (Ibid.).

These economic policies and changes reciprocally also have cultural and social consequences. The Barcelona Process originally already incorporated the framework to address these in terms of stimulating the growth of participatory civil society within the context of legitimized government (Joffé 2001, 47). Reinhardt (2002) points out that the development of civil society, and especially exchanges and communications between the civil societies of the northern and southern Mediterranean and the movement of people within the EMP overall have not been facilitated sufficiently in the past. Reinhardt (2002, 20) writes that

As far as the lack of a sense of common ownership for the Partnership is concerned, it is not sufficient to constantly complain that the Barcelona Process is a European design, even if this is true. There is little reason to expect that the process will become more equitable unless there are more inputs from the partner countries, ... [and] civil society actor[s]’ ... initiatives ... need to be exploited” as well as mobility⁹ in the region, e.g. through the introduction of a special “Barcelona visa.

Widening and Deepening of a EMRSSC - Collective Security

Buzan (1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166) introduced the concept of a *security community* and a *security complex theory*. Security community, according to Buzan (1991, 218) represents the far end on the scale of security interdependence, wherein “disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears... either political assault or military position on his continuum security configurations, related to the idea of a ‘security community’”. A security complex represents “a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan 1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166).

Hence this paper briefly addresses the extent to which the mutual roles of the EU, North Africa and the Levant beyond historical ties, and their current economic interests in a security context shift from state-centric interests to society and identity, in line with Spencer’s observation that the Mediterranean region is an example of the interplay between

the destabilizing consequences of uneven economic development in states lacking democratic accountability as a sub-state-problem, and the trans-national links of organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, drugs and arms as a supranational problem (Spencer 2001, 12).

The Euro-Mediterranean, according the parameters outline by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 16), could be termed a heterogeneous security complex, as it abandons the assumption of being locked into specific security sectors, but rather features interactions across several sectors such as states, nations, firms (incl. NGOs) and “confederations” (in the widest sense, the EU), and

⁸ including a Free Trade Area by 2010 among EMP members

⁹ These would be the “4 Freedoms” (capital, people, goods, and services) in a “perfected” common market.

across the political, economic, and societal sectors. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 17) state that there is a “cause-effect nature of the issues around which securitization takes place: the ‘facilitating conditions’ for securitization. Second is the process of securitization [as the extreme version of politicization] (Ibid., 23) itself”.

Security cooperation was envisioned from the EMP’s beginning in terms of regional inclusiveness and indivisibility (Spence 2001, 16), based on the Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean summit’s guidelines of 1999 as the basis for the EMP’s Charter for Peace and Stability¹⁰), positing the EU’s southern external borders not in the Mediterranean but south of MENA, bordering Central Asia and the greater Middle East. The debate over the borders of the EU and/or its neighborhood feeds into the debate over EU identity which has only become more sensitive during the last two enlargements of 2004 and 2007: “internal European identities are being questioned, resistance to migrant pressures is on the increase [and] there is a cultural defensiveness about the European discourse which is unlikely to favor inclusive gestures further afield” (Spencer 2001, 18). Beyond the debate of European identity and cultural definitions, implicit in the context of regional security community and –cooperation, Javier Solana’s (1997, 2, quoted in Spencer 2001, 18) pronouncements as then NATO Secretary General of the “common space, common concerns and common heritage” also linked Europe to its southern partners.

Security Communities (compare Karl Deutsch 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998, Ole Waever 1995) as “zones of peace”, are based on knowledge (broad environmental factors, e.g. demographics, shifts in global economy). This concept provides an ideational epistemic shift through the development of new interpretations of social reality/learning (i.e. alternative notions of what security is). Thus mutual trust and collective identity (based not only on material, but also on social structure) are achieved through social learning. Additionally, institutions can provide conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change, e.g. mutual trust and collective identity among the involved actors (e.g. EMP member states). Hence, I argue in this paper that the security structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions: states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents without given identities, that are (re-)constituted through complex, historical overlapping (if often contradictory) practices, and a tenuous relationship between domestic and international politics.

Hence, in Buzan and Waever (2003, 57) words: “the most relevant form of security community contains active and regional securitization, only it is not actor-to-actor (one state fearing the other and therefore counter threatening it) but a collective securitization of the overall development of the region”. In fact, Buzan and Waever (Ibid. , 67) also view Europe as likely to moving towards a structured security region “because its internal interaction capacity is much too high to permit” an unstructured security region. Chourou (2001, 61) recognizes this concern when he writes that “the competence of the EMP in the area of security has been eroding through re-conceptualization [and] attrition”. The development of a common security identity in the EMP had been overshadowed by the breakdown of the Middle East peace process most recently by the Palestinian intifada of 2000 and beyond (Ibid.). Consequently, the argument in this paper is that the essence of regional security is not about charters, but in the *processes* of a *shared commitment* to security region-wide¹¹ (compare Hallenberg 2000, especially pp. 28). The UMed, as an enhancement to the EMP to overcome its past weaknesses, is poised to contribute to this paradigm,

¹⁰ Although it has not been adopted, some authors such as Vedrine (quoted in Chourou 2001, 58) suggest that its development should be continued. While Chourou (2001, 59) doubts that it could be the independent or even an intervening variable affecting peace and stability in the Mediterranean, I would argue that the process of defining this “structure” will clarify actor’s goals, expectations – and contribute to the construction of a common regional security identity – significant, as I argue in this paper as security is not divisible, especially within a region.

¹¹ Compare the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950: “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”.

Collective security has been referred to as a condition or a process of increasing the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence (Deutsch 1957). In this regional security context, integration is occurring when the states involved cease to prepare for war against each other (a political pluralistic process leading to the status of “peace” by re-defining interests and a commitment to a “new way of life” instead of coercion. This political integration, starting at the elite level through a convergence of goals and expectations, leads later to nonpolitical integration, i.e. economic and social welfare. Hence this paper addresses the extent to which the mutual roles of the EU, North Africa and the Levant beyond historical ties and their current economic interests in a security context shift from state-centric interests to society and identity. The widening of the ENP overall (and the EMP as a sub-group within it) was apparent at the last NATO summit and EU’s role in affecting NATO’s enlargement (or pausing thereof, as the case was) (Williamson 2008).

Wendt (1999) pointed out “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than [simply] material forces” (Pace 2003, 167)¹². Applying these dynamics to discourses about and within regions, Wendt (Ibid.) argues that identities and interests of (state) actors are constructed by shared ideas rather than primordially or automatically predetermined by history or geography for example, nor are they simply a distribution of material capabilities as neo-realists hold, or simply a function of institutions, as neo-liberals would emphasize.

Europe and its southern neighbors have shared over the millennia common security concerns, though they were not always solved satisfactorily. The significance of regional stability, especially in the context of the Mediterranean security, is not simply a “flavor du jour” with respect to the foreign policy of the EU, but very much essential in analyzing the regions beyond it, i.e. stability in post-war Iraq (including intra-regional conflict) and the possibility of a fourth Gulf War¹³, or e.g. pertaining to socio-political stability towards a new “Silk Road”. Buzan and Waever (2003, 53) consider boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction as essential in a regional security complex. EU integration of member states is not experienced as a threat to national identity, but rather an affirmation according to “unity in diversity”¹⁴. In the past it has held true frequently that “the relationship with the Other as a different entity is most problematic not with those who are very distant, but with those who are closest” (Amin Maalouf in “In the name of identity”, quoted in Bensalah and Daniel, 2003, 12).

As the EMP has clear security and defense implications, the ESDP has reciprocally a Mediterranean dimension (Heisbourg 2001, 5). However, while the Barcelona process is primarily concerned with soft security, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will involve hard security approaches, pertaining to the Mediterranean, beyond border patrol, it is in coordination with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue to address security threats. These developments in conjunction with the UN intervention in Kosovo have caused considerable anxiety in MENA about the validity of their state sovereignty (Joffé 2001, 52) and expressed themselves in a reluctance to “share” security within the Mediterranean. The EMP, as a soft power approach to security in the Mediterranean, is able to by-pass this reluctance and approach collective security in this region.

In terms of neighborhood security, however, limited cooperation has been offered by the EU under the ESDP to certain ENP members (e.g. Russia, Ukraine and the non-EU European NATO members) (Schumacher 2004, 96; Biscop 2003, 186-8; and Vasconcelos 2004,6). Hence the blurring between EU hard and soft security between the ENP and the EMP vis-à-vis its neighbors

¹² A security threat in MENA would impact EU identity for example (Pace 2003, 167).

¹³ The First Gulf War viewed by many Middle Easterners as the one between Iran and Iraq in the late 1900s, the Second Gulf War being Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Third Gulf War being the recent U.S. intervention in Iraq.

¹⁴ In contrast to the U.S.’ motto of “ex pluribus unum”

becomes apparent. The role of NATO through its Mediterranean Dialogue could be integrated into the image of a EuroMed regional security complex by extrapolating this region transatlantically whereby the Mediterranean regional security complex could hypothetically be viewed as a supercomplex with the inclusion of North America¹⁵. The role of NATO in forging “a pan-European security culture that has never before existed” (de Hoop Scheffer 2008, 2) in Europe points to the strong disposition towards cooperation in tackling common security challenges (Ibid.). It could also point to a “Third Generation Regionalism” (van Langenhove 2008) as indication of a EMRSSC, with its “tailored cooperation”, e.g. in improving the protection of security of critical energy infrastructures by “complementing existing national and international efforts to maintain the flow of vital resources” (de Hoop Scheffer 2008, 4), and protect against proliferation threats and vulnerabilities in energy supply – even if the heterogeneity within the EU itself was clearly expressed at the recent NATO summit, i.a. in its uneven support of its Eastern expansion. While in terms of a Regional Security Super Complex the future hegemonic influence of the U.S. is questioned by some authors (compare Singh 2008), the unique security challenges and realignments, formulated e.g. by Kissinger (as quoted in the beginning of this paper), do not invite a de-coupling among EMRSSC, but a strengthening of inter-regional relations. This would be true among those directly or indirectly particularly vulnerable, such as those surrounding the Mediterranean, e.g. with respect to securing and diversifying energy and export routes inter-regionally (EurActiv, 11 April 2008).

This deepening of the EMRSSC, which Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, 5) also alluded to pointing out that in the past the strategic differences existed between the U.S. and the EU towards the Mediterranean, recent changes in U.S. policies towards the Middle East and North Africa on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, based on “a successful exit strategy from Iraq could in fact contribute to narrowing the transatlantic gap” (Ibid.) in the triangular nature (in Aliboni and Qatarneh’s words) of Mediterranean relations (i.e. a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex?) between the U.S., the EU and the Arab states. One might view as an “out-of-area” - or neo-hegemonic? - institutional consequence of Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex activity the recent meeting between U.S. president Bush and Russian Prime Minister Putin at Sochi to discuss a replacement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), limiting the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads (Fidler and Blitz 2008). And while Washington had traditionally viewed the EU’s plans to develop independent military capabilities as lessening their NATO commitments, the U.S. appears to welcome the complementarity between the ESDP and the U.S.’s hard power capabilities now (Fidler and Blitz 2008). This transatlantic mutual acceptance, even benediction, of NATO military capabilities is reflected by the call from the EU (exemplified by French President Sarkozy in France’s bid to re-join the alliance) (The Economist April 3, 2008).

A further extension of the ENP is the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership (European Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007), to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, ranging from climate change to development, energy, migration, peace and security, trade and regional integration and good governance human rights, between the countries beyond the southern Mediterranean and the EU. While the future geographic and political ENP-membership may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), the ENP’s potential is not¹⁶.

Joffé recognizes the reciprocity between the evolution of societal values and political change, but he discounts the role of institutions in this process. I would point out Alexander Wendt’s (1999) and Ruggie’s (1998) arguments concerning the co-constitution of identities (e.g. societal, political), actors and structures (e.g. institutions) as *the* process for social, political, economic etc. change. This reciprocal “construction” of a regional security identity within a

¹⁵ This would not affect Buzan and Waever’s view of a North American regional security complex, but simply the overlap between the Euro-Med and the North American regional security complexes.

¹⁶ Compare Senyucel et al. 2006.

EMRSC then has traditional military components, but is also perception-based components (as social constructivists would argue) which co-constitute structures. A pertinent example would be the regional security implications of the current global financial crisis. This economic threat has the potential for severe political consequences (as did the economic crisis of 1929 for the Weimar Republic). Beck (2008, 2) writes that “the traditional methods of management and control are providing unreliable and ineffective in the face of global risks... the social and political explosive force of global markets risks is becoming palpable. Governments are overthrown, civil wars become a threat.”

Analyzing the EMP within a EMRSC from a multi-level governance perspective, organized around multiple foci (national and supra-national), rather than simply as a homogeneous integration process would also be an additional perspective for analysis of the EMP. It could be viewed as a multi-layered and polycentric (Schmitter and Karl 1991) governance, not as a “regional-state”, but possibly a new polity species, such as a new-Westphalian regional integration construct, where national preferences are not fixed but co-constituted between agent and structure through processes such as preference aggregation/convergence/transformation (Prugl and Locher) made more compatible and legally binding) through regulatory, judicial and legislative channels (“Networks”) (Slaughter 2004).

Conclusions

Buzan (1991, 188) states that “in security terms, ‘region’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other”. The EMP’s mandate is based on the mutual political, economic and culturally strategic significance between the Mediterranean region and the European Union (EU) and seeks to develop a relationship between its partners based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona declaration).

This paper has expanded the theoretical concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex (MERSC) (Buzan and Waever 2004), based on the literature e.g. on security, regional integration, development and global governance towards a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex. The center of a EMRSC lies in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, rather than in MENA as Buzan and Waever (Ibid., map 1) proposed. The buffer states of a EMRSC would be e.g. the eastern EU neighborhood states (in contrast to Scandinavia and the Balkans as Buffer States in a MERSC). The insulator states of a EMRSC would be i.a. equatorial Africa, a super- and great power would be Russia, a subcomplex would be e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council, with an Asian supercomplex (compare Ibid.).

While some authors have pointed to the hesitancy of the southern Mediterranean towards the north, regional economic integration is not new to the Mediterranean, but was present extensively e.g. between the Venetian and the Middle East trades for at least one millennium, prevailing economically when political and military harmony had ceased (Spence 2007): EMP members today need to reach a consensus on – and a renewed commitment to - the need for change within a broader framework of a national development or reform program (Wurzel 2003, 8) in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The proposed UMed would have the potential to fill the insufficiencies in all security sectors existing within the current EMP.

It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New World Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with the potential for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach new and old security threats of partner countries – and the perhaps allay the fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its imminent weakening (British Council). This paradigm would fit Van Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third Regionalism”,

whereby the institutional environment for dealing with 'out of area' consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive engaging in inter-regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues, with a multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. And finally, in third generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. The EMP's potential in contributing to regional security and stability, due to its brief thirteen years' existence, is still nascent, but significant in consolidating the competing preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional structures existing today in the (transatlantic) Euro-Mediterranean "region".

DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett ed. 1998. *Security communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Aliboni, Roberto, L. Guazzone, and D. Pioppie. 2001. *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the Euro-Med Area*. Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Aliboni, Roberto, Yasar Qaterneh. 2005. *The future of the EMP in a changing context of transatlantic and regional relations*. Lisbon, Portugal.

Bearce, David H., Stacy Bondanella. 2007. Intergovernmental organizations socialization, and member-state interest convergence. *International Organization* 61, no. 703: 733.

Beck, Ulrich. This free-market farce shows how badly we need the state. *guardian.co.uk* 2008. April 20, 2008.

Biscop, S. 2003. *Euro-Mediterranean security. A search for partnership*. Arlington, VA: Ashgate.

Blitz, James. Economic stability vital for Middle East peace. *Financial Times* Sep. 18, 2007.

British Council. 2008. *Talking Transatlantic*.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and powers*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, CO and London, England: Lynne Rienner.

- de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap. 2008. *Keynote speech at the conference on 'NATO's Bucharest Summit - transformation of the Alliance and Polish and regional perspectives'*. Brussels, Belgium: NATO.
- Deutsch, Karl W., Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice J. Lee, Martin Lichtermann, Lindgren, Raymond, E., Loewenheim, Francis, L., and Van Wagenen, Richard W. 1957. *Political community and the north Atlantic area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dombey, Daniel. EU report on Iran: details and full text. *FT.com* 2007. 2/15/07.
- Dombey, Daniel, Neil Buckley , and Carola Hoyos. Nato feats Russian plans for 'gas OPEC'. *Financial Times* November 14, 2006.
- EurActiv.com. 2008. *EU sees 'huge scope for cooperation' with Central Asia*.
- European Commisison. *Barcelona declaration*. Internet on-line. Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/bed.htm>. [10/3, 2006].
- European Commission. *Euro-Mediterranean partnership: Advancing regional co-coperaiton to support peace, progress and inter-cultural dialogue*. 2007. Internet on-line. Available from <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1639&format=HTML&a...>>. , 12/11/2007].
- European Commission. 2004. *Europe and the Mediterranean: Towards a Closer Partnership. An Overview over the Barcelona Process in 2002*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- European Commission. *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona process*. Internet on-line. Available from <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/>. [10/3, 2006].
- Fidler, Stephen, James Blitz. Europe endorses missiles plan. *Financial Times* 4/4/08.
- Gorst, Isabel. Gazprom posed to gain access to energy assts in Libya with Eni. *Financial Times* 2008. April 3, 2008.
- Guazzone, Laura, Federica Bicchi. 2002. European security policies in the Mediterranean: From comprehensive to 'neo-hard'? In *Euro-Mediterranean security and the Barcelona process*. Stockholm/Sweden: Swedish National Defence College.
- Hallenbert, Jan. 2000. *The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery: France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Countries*. Stockholm/Sweden: NATO Fellowship Final Report, Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence College.

- Heisbourg, Francois. 2001. Introduction. In *The European Union as a security actor in the Mediterranean*. Zurich, Switzerland: Kurt R. Spillmann und Andreas Wenger, Forschungsstelle fuer Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH.
- Hettne, Bjorn. 1991. Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe. *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 3: 279-294.
- Joffe, George. 2001. European multilateralism and soft power projection in the Mediterranean. In *The European Union as a security actor in the Mediterranean*. Zurich, Switzerland: Kurt R. Spillmann und Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle fuer Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH.
- Kerr, Simeon. Oil rich states step up market presence. *Financial Times* 2007. 9/10/07.
- Kissinger, Henry A. The Three Revolutions. *Washington Post.com* 2008. 4/7/08.
- Lippert, Barbara. 2007. The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union. *Intereconomics* (July/August) .
- Pace, Michelle. 2003. Rethinking the Mediterranean: Reality and re-presentation in the creation of a 'region'. In *Comparative regional integration*. Burlington/VT and Hampshire/England: Ashgate.
- Pace, Michelle, and Tobias Schumacher ed. 2007. *Conceptualizing cultural and social dialogue in the euro-Mediterranean area*. New York/NY and London, England: Routledge.
- Pace, Michelle, and Tobias Schumacher ed. 2007. *Conceptualizing cultural and social dialogue in the euro-Mediterranean area*. London/England and New York, NY: Routledge.
- Pipes, Daniel. 2008. Europe or Eurabia?.
- Reinhardt, Ulrike J. 2002. *Civil Society Cooperation in the EMP: from declarations to practice*. Lisbon, Portugal .
- Ruggie, John G. 1998. What makes the World hang together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization* 52, no. 4: 855-885.
- Ruggie, John G. 1998. *Constructing the world polity*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Ruggie, John G. 1998. What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization* 52, no. 4: 855-885.

- Schmitter, Philippe, Terry L. Karl. 1991. What Democracy is ... and Is Not. *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3: 75-88.
- Shamsaddin Megalommatis, Muhammad. 2007. Russia, Islam, and the West. *American Chronicle* (12/8/07).
- Singh, Kgajendra. 2008. *The decline of US hegemony*.
- Spence, Rachel. Venice's love affair with the east. *Financial Times* Aug. 29, 2007.
- Spencer, Claire. 2001. The EU as security actor in the Mediterranean: Problems and prospects. In *The European Union as a security actor in the Mediterranean*. Zurich, Switzerland: Kurt R. Spillmann and Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle fuer Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH.
- Thornhill, John. French president to seek bolder global security role for Europe. *Financial Times* 2007. 8/28/07.
- Thornhill, John. France must break with past in globalised world, says Sarkozy. *Financial Times* November 11-12, 2006.
- Thornhill, John. French President to seek bolder global security role for Europe. *Financial Times* Aug. 28, 2007.
- Tibi, Bassam. *Europeans have stopped defending their values*.
- van Langenhove, Luk. 2007. Power to the regions, but not yet farewell to the state. *Europe's World* Spring: 113-115.
- Van Langenhove, Luk. 2008. New developments in regional integration. In *The EU and global governance*. Coral Gables, FL.
- Vasconcelos, Alvaro d. 2004. *Launching the Euro-Mediterranean Security and Defence Dialogue*. Lisbon, Portugal: .
- Vasconcelos, Alvaro, and George Joffe ed. 2000. *The Barcelona process*. London/England and Portland/OR: Frank Cass publishers.
- Waeber, Ole. 1993. *Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe*. London/England: Pinter.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization* 41, no. 3: 335-370.

Wurzel, Ulrich. 2003. *Why investment in civil society is an investment in economic development*. Lisbon, Portugal.

Zinn, Howard. War is not a solution for terrorism. *Boston Globe* (US). 2006. September 4.